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Abstract 
In this paper the empirical literature on transaction cost motivations of vertical integration 
strategies is critically reviewed. From the large number of empirical studies on this 
particular area, it emerges that, notwithstanding a) serious data and measurement 
limitations; b) the different attention given to the specific asset hypothesis with respect to 
the other hypotheses advanced by the theory; c) the unbalance between single industry 
and cross section studies; transaction cost theory is successful in explaining why firms 
may decide to internalise some stages of the manufacturing process. However, the 
growing body of empirical papers has not solved all problems, and more work is 
warranted. There are still some under researched topics which  deserve a deeper 
investigation as well as a number of methodological problems which should be addressed.  
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1.  Introduction 
Vertical integration occurs when a firm internalises one or more stages of 
production. Several motivations have been advanced in order to explain why firms 
may extend their range of operations across the vertical chain1. First, they may 
exploit technological economies. A classical example is the energy savings in the 
steel production, when downstream firms use still-hot inputs instead of buying 
steel (which has to be re-heated) from external contractors. Second, there may be 
market power advantages, with firms transferring their power across upstream 
and downstream stages. Some examples are cross subsidisation practises, the 
erection of barriers to entry, or predatory strategies. Third, there may be 
transactional economies, that is savings in the process of exchange of 
intermediate inputs, with firms emerging as organisations that challenge the 
market as an alternative mechanism for managing transactions. 
In what follows I will concentrate mostly on the third approach, which is 
based on the well-known transaction cost theory. I do not believe that the latter is 
the only theory able to account for vertical integration strategies, but it is certainly 
the most widely used, and nowadays can be considered as the orthodoxy in this 
area of studies. In reviewing the large amount of empirical works on vertical 
integration the methodology and the econometric techniques used in each single 
paper will not be discussed in depth. The attention will rather be focused on 
drawing some general conclusions, so as to underscore the relative successes and 
failures reached so far. 
Section 2 reviews the main hypotheses advanced by transaction cost theory, 
while section 3 describes the methodology used to classify the empirical works. 
The latter are discussed in sections 4 to 6. Section 7 discusses a number of critical 
issues, which might limit the strength of some empirical studies, while section 8 
includes some final comments. 
                                                 
1  See the excellent surveys by Perry (1989) and Joskow (1988). 
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2.  The transaction cost approach 
Goods and services are obtained by transforming a set of inputs. The latter 
can enter the manufacturing process in different combinations and proportions, 
depending on the technologies which have been adopted. A different perspective 
focuses on the alternative ways available for a firm to ensure the supply of inputs 
on the one hand and to reach successfully the final consumer on the other hand: 
following this approach, firms, rather than production functions, are seen as 
organisations governing a series of relationships. 
Transaction cost theory concentrates on the relative efficiency of different 
exchange processes. If for the firm-as-a-production-function view the 
internalisation of one or more stages of production might generate technological 
economies (that is savings on the costs of physical inputs), for the firm-as-
organisation view it could lead also to transactional economies (that is savings on 
the costs of exchange inputs, due to the reduced amount of resources required to 
get the intermediate inputs). An intermediate step between pure market exchange 
and vertical integration is the use of short term and long term contracts for 
transforming inputs. To some extent the decision to enter durable contractual 
relationships by signing long term contracts and the alternative vertical integration 
strategy share the same motivation: the choice among these options is then a 
matter of degree2. 
Following the transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937), firms evaluate the 
relative costs of alternative governance structures (spot market transactions, short 
term contracts, long-term contracts, vertical integration) for managing 
transactions. Transaction costs could be defined as the costs of acquiring and 
handling the information about the quality of inputs, the relevant prices, the 
supplier’s reputation, and so on. Contractual agreements are costly: costs have to 
be borne in order to negotiate and write the terms of the arrangements, to monitor 
the performance of the contracting party, to enforce the contracts. Firms emerge 
as a way of economising on transaction costs in a world of uncertainty, where 
                                                 
2  Unfortunately, this implies that it is difficult to distinguish  between them empirically  (Tirole, 1988). 
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contractual arrangements are too expensive. The basic framework was enriched 
by Williamson (1971) with the introduction of two concepts: bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1961) and opportunism. The former underlines that human beings have 
limited cognitive competencies; as a consequence, it is not possible to foresee 
each future possible contingency, so that all contracts turn out to be in some way 
incomplete. The latter is defined as ‘self interest with guile’ and is particularly 
important in small number bargaining situations. Where it is possible to choose 
among many firms, opportunism is not an important problem. If, on the other side, 
one contracting party has undertaken some specific investments in view of the 
future trade with a downstream or upstream firm, it is locked into that particular 
relationship: the ex-ante competitive situation shifts towards an ex-post bilateral 
monopoly. The firm which is not owning the specific asset may extract the so 
called quasi-rents (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978)3. Following Williamson, 
transaction costs are relevant when relationships are a) frequent, b) uncertain and 
c) if specific assets are involved4. 
a)  The exchange relationship may be one-time, occasional or recurrent; a frequent 
transaction (especially in the presence of specific assets) is more likely to be 
internalised (Williamson, 1979), since expected damages from opportunistic 
behaviour are higher; 
b)  As far as there is uncertainty, complete contracts cannot be foreseen and the 
firm making the specific investment5 could be disadvantaged if future 
contingencies require the renegotiation of the contract terms. This is known as 
the hold-up problem. Transaction cost theory individualises two kinds of 
uncertainty: environmental uncertainty, that is unpredictability of future 
contingencies, and behavioural uncertainty, that is the possibility of monitoring 
the behaviour of the contracting party; 
                                                 
3  They are measured by the difference between the value of the asset when employed in the relationship 
and the value in its best alternative use. 
4  The first two factors are very important if associated to asset specificity. 
5  Klein and Shelanski (1997) underline that uncertainty is important only when associated with specific 
assets. They argue that some confusion has been made in the empirical literature, with works 
including proxies for uncertainty without checking for the relevance of specific investments. 
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c)  Different types of asset specificity have been detected: physical capital 
specificity (when some particular machinery, used to produce components 
specific to the buyer, cannot be converted without costs to manufacture inputs 
for alternative buyers), human capital specificity (when some workers of the 
upstream firms obtain a specific knowledge of the technology and of the 
productive process of the buyer), site specificity (when downstream plants are 
located close to upstream plants for lowering transportation costs or improving 
technical efficiency), dedicated assets (when some non-specific investments, 
made in view of the relationship, lead to excess capacity after the latter has 
been broken), brand name capital (when expensive investments are made in 
order to promote a brand characterised by vertical relationships with other 
firms), design specificity (when inputs are specifically designed for the 
particular manufactures of the downstream firm).  
While it is generally recognised that transaction costs are very important in 
determining the decision between make or buy or between sell or use, one 
weakness is the underdeveloped treatment of the disadvantages of vertical 
integration. The proponents of the theory point out the presence of managerial 
diseconomies, or the emergence of mistakes in allocating factors when firm’s size 
and the number of inputs become large6, but the boundaries of the firm remain in 
some way undetermined. It is not clear why a firm, by using selective 
interventions, cannot continue to integrate forward and backward and perform 
better than decentralised competitors7. Grossman and Hart (1986) solved this 
puzzle by noticing that ownership confers residual rights of control over physical 
assets, so that “a firm that purchases its supplier, thereby removing residual rights 
of control from the manager of the supplying company, can distort the manager’s 
incentive sufficiently to make common ownership harmful” (p. 692). Hart (1989) 
argues that vertical integration between independent firms which have 
complementary assets is beneficial, since it reduces the number of parties with 
                                                 
6  Kole and Lehn (1997) analyse the merger between USAir and Piedmont Aviation in 1987. They found 
that the operation did destroy value, with two profitable firms that were transformed into the least 
profitable carrier in the industry. The reasons of this unsuccess have been individualised by the 
authors in the failure to integrate the workforces of the merging firms. 
7  This is known as the selective intervention puzzle (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989). 
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 3/1999 
 6
hold-up power. Following this line of reasoning, which takes into account the 
incentives for managers and workers, forward integration strategies have different 
effects from backward integration ones. The firm which integrates backward or 
forward is also the one which acquires the ownership and the residual rights of 
control over the integrated assets. This in turn inevitably distorts the incentives of 
those employees who were previously working in a independent entity and now 
are constrained to use assets over which they have a restricted, if any, freedom of 
disposal. 
Another serious criticism is that Williamson’s  theory, while making use 
of concepts such as bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty, remains 
however embedded in the static and optimising neoclassical framework. As 
Medema (1992) points out: “for Williamson, there exists a single most 
economical governance structure. In some cases markets are optimal while in 
other cases hierarchies are optimal”. However, “if bounded rationality, in the 
sense of Simon, leads to vertical integration, this result is due to the limited 
capacity of the human mind, not to economising on the use of the human mind”. 
After having put in the arena concepts which require a heterodox treatment, it is 
somewhat limiting to force them into a orthodox framework. 
3.  The empirical methodology 
Since the purpose of the paper is to review the empirical literature based 
on transaction cost theory, the other motivations for vertical integration strategies 
(technological savings, market power) will be considered only if related or 
compared to transaction cost arguments.  
The available empirical models have been seen as crude (Williamson, 
1989) in two respects: on the one side the hypotheses which have been tested are 
very simple and lead to gross predictions. There are in fact many potential 
motivations that could explain the vertical structure of a firm. Models generally 
refer to one or two kinds of asset specificity, while technological, historical or 
environmental factors are rarely included (Lyons, 1995). On the other side the 
dataset required for the empirical investigation are hardly recoverable from 
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official statistical sources. Available information is generally of little help and 
researchers have been forced to construct their own sets of data or to rely on 
proxies which are sometimes only indirectly linked to the phenomenon under 
study. 
The main hypotheses of transaction cost theory are that small number 
bargaining problems, highly specific assets, frequent relationships, and 
uncertainty could induce firms to internalize some stages of the production 
process. Different empirical investigations could be in principle, and have been in 
practice, conducted. In order to put some systematicity I extend the categorisation 
introduced by Lyons (1996) to analyse the empirical literature on contract theory. 
Studies have been classified in four typologies, as illustrated in table 1 below: 
Type 1) studies look at the different contractual arrangements (basically, 
the use of the market mechanism versus internal sourcing) devised to obtain 
different inputs by one or a small number of firms; 
Type 2) studies focus on the different ways to manage transactions in a 
sample of firms active in a particular industry (type 2a) or in different industries 
(type 2b); 
Type 3) works are case studies which make no extensive use of 
econometrics or statistical analysis; 
Type 4) studies examine the causes and the effects of the degrees of 
vertical integration in different industries. 
The choice between single industry (1, 2a) and cross section studies (2b, 4) 
implies the usual trade-off between the precision of the results and the possibility 
for them to be employed in more general interpretations. The nature of the 
predictions, together with some data and measurement problems, makes the 
transaction cost theory particularly apt to be tested in single industries or by 
limiting the analysis to some particular stages of the vertical chain. However, this 
does not preclude the possibility to draw some general conclusions. As Bresnahan 
(1989) correctly points out: ‘A single industry case study cannot paint a broad 
picture....The integration of different case studies to give a unified picture of the 
whole map is an obviously attractive prospect’ (p.1051). As it will be shown, 
more than 30 studies will be put into the arena for attempting such a broad picture. 
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Table 1. Empirical studies of vertical integration 
 
Typology Empirical studies 
Type 1 
One firm or a few number of firms 
Monteverde and Teece (1982a) 
Monteverde and Teece (1982b) 
Masten (1984) 
Walker and Weber (1984)* 
Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1989) 
Weiss (1994) 
Type 2a 
Single industry studies 
Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) 
Joskow (1987) 
Anderson (1988) 
Lieberman (1991) 
Ohanian (1994) 
Jensen and Rothwell (1998) 
Coles and Hesterly (1998) 
Type 2b 
Cross section studies 
Spiller (1985)* 
Helfat and Teece (1987) 
John and Weitz (1988) 
Weiss (1992) 
Majumdar and Ramaswamy (1994) 
Minkler and Park (1994) 
Lyons (1995)* 
Type 3 
Case studies 
Stuckey (1983)* 
Joskow (1985) 
Hennart (1988)* 
Tapon (1989) 
Muris, Scheffman, and Spiller( 1992) 
Krickx (1995) 
Cook (1997)* 
Type 4 
Studies of the degree of vertical 
integration 
Levy (1985) 
Mac Donald (1985) 
Martin (1986) 
Caves and Bradburd (1988) 
Davies and Morris (1995) 
*Indicates comparative studies. 
 
From a different point of view, empirical investigations might test the 
relative importance of alternative theories of vertical integration or they might be 
limited to check the relevance of the hypotheses advanced by one single theory. In 
particular, one type of uncertainty, demand variability, has been developed as a 
separate theory (Carlton, 1979). This could explain why Lieberman (1991) in his 
investigation on the empirical determinants of vertical integration considered the 
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demand variability motivation as an alternative theory to transaction cost theory. 
The same ‘vagueness’ led Spiller (1985) to consider the available empirical 
investigations of transaction cost theory mainly as tests of the ‘specific asset 
hypothesis’. In what follows we should keep in mind this distinction between the 
full set of hypotheses stemming from transaction cost theory and the more 
restricted set which investigates the role of specific assets. 
Section 4 addresses empirical works based only on the transaction cost 
theory, while section 5 deals with comparative studies and section 6 focuses on 
type 4 studies. 
4.  Transaction cost motivations in the empirical literature 
Single theory studies are overwhelming in this field of studies. Moreover, 
empirical works are mainly addressed to test the role of specific assets for vertical 
integration, while the other variables have been given less attention. However, it 
could be argued that uncertainty is very hard to measure and is pervasive, so that 
it does not distinguish many relationships. On the other hand, frequency is not so 
obviously important and is more diffusely treated in the empirical literature on 
contract theory (Lyons, 1996), which has many points of contact with the works 
reviewed here. 
4.1. Physical assets 
Lieberman (1991) studied the determinants of backward integration 
strategies in the US chemical industry (type 2a). Some chemical inputs are liquid 
at room temperature and may be transported via tank cars. Other inputs are gasses 
at room temperature and are shipped through pipelines, which represent expensive 
specific assets. The author found that chemical firms were more often integrated 
backward when they were using gaseous inputs, that is in correspondence of 
specific investments. Coles and Hesterly (1998) analysed the make or buy 
decision relative to 15 services (ranging from therapy, laboratory, to housekeeping 
and foodservice) provided by hospitals. The findings suggested that the higher the 
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degree of asset specificity (notable, if the service requires equipment which 
cannot be used to provide similar services in other hospitals and which has a low 
salvage value) the higher the probability that the service is made in house8. An 
indirect test of the importance of physical asset specificity was undertaken by 
Weiss (1992 and 1994). The author was particularly interested in vertical mergers 
and argued that specific investments between the merging firms should have been 
reflected in positively correlated residual stock returns9. In fact, with specific 
investments firms will probably arrange some profit sharing agreements: as a 
consequence, a demand or supply shock will hurt both firms and its effects are 
likely to be shared between them. By examining 29 cases of mergers, Weiss 
(1992) found that the residual stock returns of a merging firm were correlated to 
the returns of the other merging partner. Moreover, the above correlation was 
higher than the correlation with all the other firms in the partner’s industry. The 
above results were associated to transaction cost arguments without checking for 
the actual presence of specific investments but on the ground that ‘firm specific 
capital theory is unique in predicting a positive correlation between these returns’ 
(Weiss, 1994, p.395). In a later paper (Weiss, 1994), however, the same analysis 
was applied to three cases (type 1) in which firm specific investments had been 
actually made, with similar results. 
4.2. Human assets 
Human asset specificity has been examined by Anderson and Schmittlein 
(1984) relative to the decision of using a direct sales force instead of contracting 
with independent agents in the electronic components industry (type 2a). The use 
of direct salespeople was found to be positively correlated to an index of human 
asset specificity, built on the basis of the time needed for a new salesman to 
become familiar with firm’s product lines. A similar study has been conducted by 
John and Weitz (1988), with two main differences: first they investigate forward 
                                                 
8  The authors examined also the role of human asset specificity and uncertainty on the make or buy 
decision. When uncertainty was interacted with physical and human asset specificity, it was found to 
have a stronger impact on vertical integration. 
9  The residual stock return is the return after having removed market and industry effects. 
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integration into distribution by a set of firms operating in different industries (type 
2b), second they use a proxy for the ‘degree’ of forward vertical integration, that 
is a measure of the percentage of sales made through direct channels. Again, the 
higher the level of skill required from salespersons, the higher the degree of 
vertical integration. 
Monteverde and Teece (1982b) have been concerned with the effects of 
the engineering effort required to develop components in the automotive industry 
(type 1), showing that the probability of manufacturing the component internally 
was increasing with the amount of the engineering effort. 
Anderson (1988) addressed the issue of human specificity from a different 
perspective. He investigated the determinants of opportunism in the production of 
electronic components (type 2a), with the hypothesis that integrated systems of 
sale would leave less room for opportunistic behaviour by salespeople. 
Opportunism was measured on a scale variable through a questionnaire given to 
superiors, and the coefficient of a variable checking for vertical integration was 
found to be negatively affecting it. 
Masten et al. (1989) tried to assess the relative importance of human 
specificity as opposed to other specific investments. Their work was motivated by 
the evidence provided by Monteverde and Teece (1982a), who found that to 
circumvent the problem of physical asset specificity it was sufficient to undertake 
quasi-vertical integration strategies10. In a study of three automobile 
manufacturers (type 1), Masten et al. (1989) found that specific know-how (which 
implies human asset specificity) had a positive influence on vertical integration 
(measured as a percentage of components produced inside the firm) while proxies 
for physical and site specificity were found not to be important. They interpreted 
these results as evidence supporting the idea that human assets specificity was 
more important than physical asset specificity as an incentive for vertical 
integration. 
                                                 
10  These are situations in which a downstream firm owns the specific capital, but leaves the firm using it 
as an independent entity. 
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4.3. Site specificity 
Site specificity was analysed, among others, by Joskow (1985). By 
studying backward integration strategies of electricity firms into the upstream coal 
industry, he found that mine-mouth coal generating plants were more likely to be 
vertically integrated or, to a lesser degree, were induced to sign long term 
contracts with the independent coal suppliers (type 3). Levy’s and Spiller’s 
studies, which will be discussed in section 5, are two other pieces of evidence 
consistent with the view that site specificity stimulates the internalisation of 
activities. 
4.4. Design specificity 
Design specificity has been addressed by Masten (1984) for the aerospace 
industry. He associated the need to dispose of specifically designed components 
with the probability of activating internal production (type 1). In this industry the 
government generally contracts with the aerospace firm for a complex product to 
be provided. The contractor may decide to develop all the components of the 
product internally or, alternatively, to rely on external sub-contractors. Each 
component in the sample was judged as specific and as complex, two qualities 
which proxy respectively for design specificity and uncertainty. The results 
highlighted that both characteristics were leading to vertical integration in most 
cases. Design specificity was found to stimulate backward integration strategies 
also in the study by Monteverde and Teece (1982b) discussed above. 
4.5. Brand name capital 
This type of asset specificity has been investigated by Minkler and Park 
(1994) for franchised firms in the restaurant industry, in the hotel industry and in 
the business and profession service industry (type 2b). The authors argued that the 
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proportion of company owned outlets should depend positively on a measure of 
brand name capital11. The results were consistent with the above hypothesis. 
4.6. Dedicated assets 
Joskow (1987) (type 2a) conducted a study on the duration of contracts 
between coal suppliers and electricity utilities, including a proxy for dedicated 
assets among the explanatory variables. It was argued that the amount of coal 
supply specified in the contract was a good indicator of the presence of dedicated 
assets because, in the case of contract breaching, the seller party could find 
himself with an excess capacity and the purchaser could hardly obtain alternative 
supplies. Consistently with the expectations, the above variable was positively 
correlated to the contract length. Tapon (1989) (type 3) examined vertical 
disintegration in the pharmaceutical industry. He started noticing that owned 
laboratories had become less productive and creative than independent 
laboratories through time. As a consequence, firms were increasingly using long 
term R&D joint ventures with academic laboratories. The authors argued that this 
was consistent with the transaction cost theory because, as compared to 
independent ones, academic scientists have less room for opportunism other than 
site specificity and human asset specificity problems, the transaction between a 
R&D laboratory and firms which will be using the R&D results involves 
dedicated assets too, because the investment undertaken in view of the specific 
project cannot be easily employed in alternative uses. 
4.7. Frequency 
The evidence available on the effect of the frequency of transactions is 
limited. Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) included in their analysis a proxy for 
frequency, broadly linked to the time agents spend for travelling, that is to the 
                                                 
11  This was  proxied by the difference between the market value and the book value of the franchisor’s 
equity. 
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density of the served market12. The proxy was found not to be significant, even 
when interacted with asset specificity. Conversely, Majumdar and Ramaswamy 
(1994) (type 3) found that in industries manufacturing goods characterised by 
frequent purchases, the downstream distribution activities were more likely to be 
fully integrated. Jensen and Rothwell (1998) analysed the decision to rely on 
subcontractors or on in-house employees for undertaking some tasks in nuclear 
power plants. The empirical results suggested that frequent tasks (routine 
maintenance, reactor operations, waste processing) were done by workers, while 
infrequently performed tasks (refuelling, special maintenance) were positively 
associated with the presence of independent contractors. 
4.8. Uncertainty 
Unlike frequency, uncertainty has been addressed in a discrete number of 
empirical papers. Lieberman (1991) attempted to test Carlton’s hypotheses about 
demand variability, following which a high demand variability in the downstream 
market as well as a high demand variability in the upstream market correlated 
with the former are obstacles for vertical integration strategies. Conversely, if 
variability in the input market is not correlated with that of the downstream 
market, backward vertical integration becomes more attractive. In his study only 
the latter variable (proxied with the variance of the upstream market output after 
having controlled for variations in the output of the downstream market) was 
found to be significant. Helfat and Teece (1987) addressed environmental 
uncertainty by examining the response of firms’ returns to general economic 
uncertainty (undiversifiable risk). They showed in a sample of 14 vertical mergers 
that the merged firms had a lower response than the response of each single firm 
participating to the merger in the pre-merger period. Majumdar and Ramaswamy 
(1994) associated environmental uncertainty with the presence of major 
technological changes in the manufacturing of the product. They investigated also 
the role of behavioural uncertainty, proxied with a dummy variable inversely 
                                                 
12  The underlying hypothesis is that in areas characterised by high densities selling agents spend less 
time in travelling, so direct salespersons are more likely to be used. 
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linked to the number of end users, under the assumption that independent 
distributors would increase their power if consumers were limited in number (in 
which case the dummy was set equal to 1). Both variables were positively 
associated to forward integration into sale activities. These results are similar to 
the ones obtained by John and Weitz (1988). Their measure of environmental 
uncertainty was constructed by asking sales managers how turbulent and uncertain 
they considered their market, while the difficulty to asses the performance of 
salespeople was assumed to be correlated with the length of the selling cycle. 
Again, both variables had a positive influence on vertical integration. 
The works examined so far may be considered as the core of the empirical 
literature on vertical integration. Most of them concentrate on a single industry, 
while the few cross section studies available are interested mainly in forward 
integration strategies towards selling activities. Moreover, asset specificity, and in 
particular physical and human assets, are the principal areas of interest. Having 
said this, it appears that the theoretical predictions are almost always successfully 
and convincingly confirmed. Klein and Shelanski (1995), in  reviewing the 
empirical literature on transaction cost economics (TCE), maintain by similar 
arguments that the findings are ‘remarkably consistent with the predictions of 
TCE - more so than is typically the case in economics’. 
5.  Competing theories 
The success of a theory is judged also by putting it into comparison with 
alternative, and possibly mutually exclusive, explanations. As we will see, more 
work has to be done in this direction. Spiller’s paper (Spiller, 1985) is one of the 
few studies available on the relative importance of alternative theories of vertical 
integration. Starting from the analysis of the gains resulting from a sample of 
vertical mergers (type 2b) as well as from their different distribution among the 
firms participating to the merger, he contrasted the ‘specific asset’ story with the 
market power theory (which basically considers vertical integration as mainly 
driven by the desire to obtain a higher market power). In particular, following the 
latter hypothesis, the overall gains from vertical mergers should be positively 
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related to the market power of the target firm or to the market power of the 
acquiring firm. However, gains should be lower in the event that both sides did 
enjoy already some degree of market power13. Conversely, transaction cost theory 
associates the gains to the fact that specific assets are at play, whereas the 
variables checking for market power effects have no predicted sign14. While the 
coefficients on concentration variables were not significant or had the wrong sign, 
a proxy for site specificity15 was found to positively influence the gains from 
mergers.  
Another comparative study has been conducted by Stuckey (1983) for the 
aluminium industry. She finds that backward vertical integration by aluminium 
refiners into bauxite and alumina was mainly driven by site specificity while 
forward integration into smelting and fabrication was due to market power 
considerations (notably, the possibility to engage in price discrimination in 
downstream markets). The aluminium industry has been investigated also by 
Hennart (1988) (type 3) together with the tin industry. He argues that the high 
level of backward vertical integration in aluminium is justified by transaction cost 
arguments while the lower level of upstream integration in the tin industry could 
be explained by lower economies of scale and lower transportation costs for the 
miners of alluvial ores as compared to lode ores.  
Recently, Cook (1997) examined the vertical integration of the brewing 
and petrol industries in the UK (type 3) and showed that the former was consistent 
with market power considerations, while the latter was better explained by 
transaction cost arguments. Vertical integration in the beer industry declined 
between 1965 and 1990, while an opposite trend was interesting petrol firms. 
Since monopoly power decreased and competition increased in both industries, 
the author argues that the previous high levels of vertical integration were harmful 
for the beer industry, while the recent high levels of vertical integration are 
beneficial for the petrol industry. 
                                                 
13  When market power is enjoyed by only one firm vertical integration should reduce the previous 
inefficiency, while in the case of bilateral market power it is reasonable to assume that the firms were 
already agreeing on an efficient pricing scheme. 
14  Similar hypotheses are tested for the target firm’s share in total gains. 
15  In this study site specificity was related to the distance between the firms resulting from the merger. 
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On the whole, notwithstanding the incidental presence of mixed results, 
the few studies comparing transaction cost predictions with alternative theories 
highlight that the former are dominating. Another empirical finding consistent 
with this view has been provided by Lyons (1995). Following the heuristic 
approach developed by Williamson, he investigates the relationship between 
transaction cost advantages of vertical integration and the technological 
disadvantages implied by the presence of economies of scale and scope16. The 
context is the decision between subcontracting or internal production of 
specialised inputs by a set of firms operating in different industries (type 2b). He 
finds that in the presence of both asset specificities and economies of scale and 
scope, vertical integration revealed to be the preferred strategy, while in the 
absence of asset specificity, economies of scale moved the balance towards 
external sourcing17. Walker and Weber (1984), stimulated by the heuristic 
approach in a similar way, tested the importance of transaction cost considerations 
as opposed to supplier production cost advantages. They examined a sample of 60 
make or buy decisions relative to some simple components manufactured by a car 
manufacturer (type 1). The results gave strong support for external sourcing 
decisions in the case of cost disadvantages and limited support for the other 
variables testing for uncertainty and asset specificity (volume and technological 
uncertainty, small number bargaining problems).  
6.  The degree of vertical integration: type 4 studies 
Most of the above cited empirical works refer to single industries (type 1 
and type 2a). Moreover, when they are relative to a cross section of industries 
(type 2b) they concentrate mostly on one stage of the vertical chain. I turn now to 
studies which try to synthesise the determinants of vertical integration strategies 
through global measures. In order to examine the relevance of specific assets in 
                                                 
16  In this case, as independent producers can aggregate several productions, vertical integration could not 
be a good strategy, as far as specific assets are not important. 
17  Another interesting result is that in the absence of economies of scale, most of the inputs were 
produced internally. This could be due to the fact that the inputs under examination were specifically 
designed to comply with firms’ requirements.  
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influencing vertical integration for a cross section of industries it is necessary to 
devise some reliable measures of the degree of vertical integration. Moreover, in 
this kind of studies it is only possible to rely on very crude proxies for specific 
assets. A proxy that has been used for physical capital is the capital labour ratio, 
while human specific investments have been linked to research and development 
expenditures (Martin, 1993). Small number bargaining problems have been 
investigated by introducing measures of downstream industry and upstream 
industry concentration levels18. 
Mac Donald (1985) used a measure at the industry level of the proportion 
of industry shipments that are directed toward plants owned by the seller. That 
measure was positively correlated with proxies at the industry level for capital 
intensity and for buyer and seller concentration. Levy (1985) calculated the 
widely used and widely criticised value added to sales ratio at the firm level. He 
tried to test the role of uncertainty and site specificity by including a proxy for 
unanticipated demand shift and by measuring the weighted average of the 
proportion of goods shipped less than 500 miles far from plants19. Martin (1986) 
examined separately industry average forward (FVI) and backward (BVI) vertical 
integration. The measures were computed by exploiting available information on 
the amount of inputs produced and consumed within each industry. He regressed 
FVI and BVI on proxies for average firm size, concentration, number of trading 
partners, transportation and distribution margins. Concentration was treated as an 
endogenous variable and was regressed, among other variables, on FVI and BVI. 
Similarly, price cost margins at the industry level were regressed on BVI and FVI. 
As to the findings, he obtained mixed results consistent both with transaction cost 
arguments and with the market power view. Forward integration was positively 
related to distribution margins, while the fewness of trading partners was 
                                                 
18  A good proxy for the presence of small number bargaining problems is the  product between the 
concentration level of one industry and the weighted average of the downstream (or upstream) 
industries with which it has links (Davies and Morris, 1995). Nevertheless, some empirical studies 
make direct reference to the transaction cost hypothesis by including  two separate variables for the 
upstream industry and downstream industry. In this case it is not clear which theory (market power or  
transaction cost) is being tested.  
19  The former was found to be positively related to the degree of vertical integration, while the latter was 
not significant. 
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stimulating both backward and forward vertical integration. On the other hand, 
concentration was found to be positively related to backward integration. The 
positive effect of concentration on price cost margins was sometimes reduced and 
sometimes increased by vertical integration. Martin interpreted this latter result by 
differentiating vertical integration within each industry from vertical integration 
out of the industry, that is backward and forward operations by plants with main 
activities in other industries. The latter may reflect the desire to expand operations 
in industries were it is possible to enjoy high price cost margins, while the former 
may reflect market power motivations such as the erection of barriers to entry. 
Caves and Bradburd (1986) used a measure at the industry level of the proportion 
of companies which were vertically integrated, which was found to be positively 
correlated to variables attempting to catch the presence of small number 
bargaining problems and the investment in specific assets. Davies and Morris 
(1995) used the information available in the input-output tables on the 
relationships between upstream and downstream industries to infer the extent of 
intra-firm flows of intermediate inputs. While the main interest of the paper was 
the introduction of a new measure to be used for analysing the outstanding pattern 
of vertical integration in the UK manufacturing, the authors conducted also an 
empirical investigation, with findings broadly consistent with the ones obtained 
by Mac Donald (1985) and by Caves and Bradburd (1986). Finally, Ohanian 
(1994) applied a similar methodology to study vertical integration strategies in the 
pulp and paper industry (type 2a). For each mill the ratio of pulp capacity to paper 
capacity was linked to measures of concentration and mill size. He found that both 
variables were positively correlated to vertical integration. The joint buyer and 
seller market concentration was the usual proxy for small number bargaining 
problems, while the size variable was, in the author’s view, taking into account 
the fact that larger firms would have suffered more from a supply disruption20.  
The general results coming from these series of studies suggest that 
vertical integration is prominent in capital intensive industries, when economies 
of scale are important, and where upstream and downstream concentration levels 
                                                 
20  However, if there are economies of scale in the upstream stage, vertical integration might be due to 
cost advantages, independently from transaction cost motivations.  
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are high. Differently from the empirical works reviewed in the previous section, 
here low effort is put in order to discriminate between the market power 
explanation and the transaction cost approach. The continuous indices of vertical 
integration which have been introduced and used reflect a commendable effort in 
order to reach more precision in the measurement of this complex phenomenon. 
Apart from the use of particular and discontinuous information sets, which appear 
una-tantum in official statistics, the information included in input-output tables is 
indeed very useful for measuring vertical integration (Vannoni, 1996). In fact the 
tables contain information at the industry level on the amounts of inputs received 
from different industries and on the amounts of goods transferred to other 
industries, which can be easily exploited to make inferences on the transfer of 
inputs within each firm. 
7.  Measurement and data problems, cross country and time differences 
As has already been pointed out, in empirical works concerning this area 
both dependent and explanatory variables are difficult to measure. We reviewed 
the different and sometimes ingenious ways that have been devised in order to 
obtain some proxies for specific assets, uncertainty, frequency. Vertical 
integration has mainly been proxied with a dichotomous variable, notwithstanding 
it is not a one-or-zero phenomenon. Moreover, this approach implies some 
selection bias because in the real world firms are using both direct and indirect 
channels to sell the same product, and they are using both internal production and 
external contractors for obtaining intermediate inputs. Publicly available 
information is generally of little help and data are frequently obtained directly 
through questionnaires. Finally, for type 4 studies, the proxies used for 
investigating the relevance of specific assets are sometimes questionable.  
In spite of these serious drawbacks, which should constitute a warning 
against the possibility to use the outcomes of each particular study for more 
general interpretations, on the whole there is enough evidence consistent with the 
transaction cost theory. However, some improvements could be easily made. On 
the one hand, it could be possible to ameliorate single industry studies by using 
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some measures of the degree of vertical integration. On the other hand, the quality 
of cross section studies could be improved by limiting the wideness of the cross 
section, as well as by restricting the investigation to particular stages of the 
vertical chain. 
Another important issue is the analysis of differences between countries. 
Most studies are relative to the US, and, to a lesser extent, to the UK. Caves 
(1989, p.1227) argues that “if competition worked the same way in every country 
and the transaction-costs efficiencies of firms and markets were independent of 
laws, cultural traits, and other distinguishing traits of nationhood, then we should 
expect the allocation between firms and markets to differ only inessentially from 
country to country”. Similarly, Majumdar and Ramaswamy (1994, p.127) argue 
that “in other geographical market domains such as Asia or Africa incentives may 
differ. There is enough evidence to suggest that incentive facing Japanese firms 
are quite different from those facing US firms. Thus, our results are subject to 
cultural specificity as well”. According to this view, Hennart (1988) found that 
vertical integration in the tin industry was low in Malaysia, Thailand and 
Australia, while it was very high in Bolivia and Indonesia and explained these 
differences with different historical paths and different State interventions. 
Similarly, Khanna and Palepu (1997) argue that in emerging markets, firms which 
operate directly in a range of industries may “imitate the functions of several 
institutions which are present only in advanced economies”. Examples of such 
advantages are the possibility to train their own workers, the avoidance of contract 
enforcement problems, or the guarantee of receiving inputs with an acceptable 
level of quality.  
Finally, vertical integration incentives are not constant through time. 
Krickx (1995) investigated the variations in the vertical integration strategies 
undertaken by the 10 biggest computer manufacturers between 1950 and 1970. He 
argued that in the early stages of the industry firms were mainly using receiving 
tubes as components and there was no compelling reason to produce in the same 
firm the components and the central processors. With the advent of integrated 
circuits in the sixties, on the other hand, transaction cost motivations (uncertainty 
and asset specificity) pushed firms to become more vertically integrated. Ohanian 
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(1994) found that recent entrants in the pulp industry were more affected by 
specific assets in their vertical integration decisions, while established firms were 
less prone to alter their integrated structure. Cook (1997) argues that the sources 
of transaction costs (physical assets, brand name capital) increased in the brewing 
and in the petrol industries in the 1965-1990 period, and firms had been forced to 
cope with this evolving pattern. The same issue is implicit in Tapon’s analysis, 
following which the technological progress in pharmaceutical R&D rendered 
firm’s internal laboratories inefficient as compared to independent laboratories. 
With similar arguments, Muris et al. (1992) individualised in the change of 
technology, and in the need for more coordination in the distribution of products, 
the increased stimulus for firms operating in the carbonated beverage industries to 
integrate towards the bottling activities over the last 20 years. Finally, Weiss 
(1994) was not only interested in the reasons for mergers but also in explaining 
the timing of mergers and divestitures. In particular, he argued that Pepsico 
acquired one of its independent bottlers because the specific investments were 
increasing in importance through time. Conversely, IBM reduced its share of 
interest in Intel (which was producing semiconductors) either because the 
contracts for the input supply were becoming more reliable or because 
technological advances rendered the specific investment less important.  
8. Concluding comments 
Referring to the transaction cost literature available at the time he was 
writing, Sheperd (1986, p.44) stated that “the theory is largely confined to special 
cases and is largely untested as a factual matter. It may yet attain general 
importance, but that seems to await a broader set of analyses and empirical test”. 
In a similar vein, Simon (1991) argues that ‘in general the new institutional 
economics has not drawn heavily from the empirical works in organisation and 
decision-making for its auxiliary assumptions. Nevertheless, it is appropriately 
subversive of neoclassical theory in that it suggests a whole agenda of 
microeconomic empirical work that must be performed to estimate the exogenous 
parameters and to test the theory empirically. Until that research has been carried 
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out (and the existing literature on organizations and decision making taken into 
account), the new institutional economics and related approaches are acts of faith, 
or perhaps of piety’. I am confident that this paper has demonstrated that 
empirical studies in vertical integration have to a great extent challenged 
Sheperd’s and Simon’s concerns. Of the 32 works reviewed here, 22 have been 
written after 1986 and 13 after 1991. On the whole the empirical work on the 
relevance of transaction cost motivations in determining vertical integration 
strategies is successfully confirming the hypotheses advanced by the theory. This 
is true for both single tests and comparative studies. 
Of course, I am not saying that all forward and backward integration 
strategies are driven by efficiency reasons and should not be contrasted by the 
antitrust authorities. Certainly market power motivations may be well important in 
some circumstances and should not be ignored. Waterson (1993), in comparing 
the hostile and the benign views towards vertical arrangements, concludes that 
“the general lessons are that a concentrated vertical market structure is not 
necessarily undesirable, and that freely negotiated contractual relationships are not 
necessarily benign”. A similar view can be found in Martin (1986): “The fact that 
the impacts of integration on structure and performance vary across clusters 
within the manufacturing sector and the fact that these impacts are complex and 
interactive, strongly suggests that policy decisions relating to vertical integration 
be approached in a ‘case by case’, ‘rule of reason’ way”. 
I believe that in future works researchers should look for some 
compromises between cross-section studies (that are forced to use measures which 
are only crude proxies for vertical integration and specific assets) and single 
industry studies (which leave less room for general applications). Cross country 
differences and the evolution of vertical integration incentives upon time should 
not be ruled out as well. Finally, a further development could be obtained by 
conducting some comparative studies of vertical integration strategies as opposed 
to the use of long-term and short-term contracts, since they share similar 
underlying motivations. 
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